Industry Insights

The land of the rising silicon: Japan’s bid to power the AI age

The land of the rising silicon: Japan’s bid to power the AI age

When Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the world’s largest chip maker, opened its first semiconductor factory in Japan in February 2024, the ceremony marked more than the launch of a new production site.

Although in Japanese culture, factory openings in Japan are an occasion for highly stylised and optimistic remarks, the opening of Japan Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing (JASM), a joint venture with Sony Semiconductor Solutions, in Kumamoto on the southern island of Kyushu seemed to provoke corporate leaders to go even further than usual.

“The entire Japanese automotive industry is very grateful for the start of production of automotive semiconductors, and we will never forget the kindness of TSMC, who extended a helping hand to us when the automotive industry was unable to produce cars in the past due to a shortage of semiconductors,” gushed Toyota Chairman, Akio Toyoda.


Lasertec Vice President, Tetsuya Sendoda, called the collaboration a “crucial step forward in advancing the industry,” adding that “we eagerly anticipate contributing our knowledge and support to TSMC’s Kumamoto Factory during this significant moment, jointly embracing a new milestone in semiconductor manufacturing.”

And it turned out, TSMC’s Kumamoto facility, producing 22 and 28 nanometre chips which are mostly used in automotive and industrial applications, was just a start.

In 2024, TSMC announced plans for a second fab producing leading-edge logic chips, alongside additional 28 nanometre production, in a joint venture with Toyota Motor Corporation and DENSO Corporation, which is due to start production in 2027. Together, the two facilities are expected to represent more than $20 billion of investment and produce more than 100,000 300mm wafers a month across a range of processes.

And, TSMC says a third Japanese fab, potentially producing 2 nanometre chips in Japan is under discussion for 2030 although the plans could be complicated by Taiwan’s tightening restrictions on the overseas transfer of advanced chipmaking technology.

Karate-chopping its way to 2nm

Perhaps more ambitiously still are plans from Japanese state-backed chip maker Rapidus.

Born out of a partnership with IBM and backed by the Japanese government and a consortium of domestic companies, the company is attempting to leap directly into leading-edge logic manufacturing, targeting mass production of 2 nanometre chips in 2027.

The ambition is enormous. Only a handful of companies, including TSMC and Samsung, currently possess the expertise and infrastructure needed to manufacture leading-edge chips at commercial scale.

For Japan, these investments represent something larger than technological know-how or money: an attempt to rebuild its position in one of the most strategically important industries of the 21st century.

In the late 1980s, Japan accounted for more than half of global semiconductor manufacturing and was home to three of the world’s largest semiconductor companies: NEC, Toshiba, and Hitachi.

Japanese engineers had built a formidable reputation for precision manufacturing, quality control, and operational excellence. In 1987, Toshiba researchers unveiled NAND flash memory, a technology that would become fundamental to USB drives, smartphones, solid-state storage, and data centres.

From semiconductor Samurai to supporting cast

But Japan’s dominance did not last. The personal computer revolution shifted demand towards logic processors, while the rise of specialist foundries such as TSMC changed the economics of chip production. Japanese companies, accustomed to controlling the entire semiconductor process, struggled to adapt to a more fragmented industry.

South Korea emerged as a memory powerhouse, Taiwan became the centre of advanced foundry manufacturing, and Japanese chipmakers lost ground.

Japan’s semiconductor decline, however, did not mean it abandoned the industry. Instead, it moved deeper into the less visible parts of the value chain, retaining powerful positions in the materials, equipment, and the technologies needed to manufacture chips.

Japanese companies remain major players in memory, image sensors, automotive, and industrial semiconductors. Renesas Electronics supplies microcontrollers for automotive and industrial applications; KIOXIA remains a major NAND flash producer; Sony Semiconductor Solutions is a global leader in image sensors; and ROHM is a significant supplier of power semiconductors.

The country is particularly strong in semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment.

Japanese companies account for around 92% of global revenue in photoresist processing equipment and 64% in semiconductor manufacturing automation equipment, according to Boston Consulting Group. Japanese suppliers also have dominant positions in areas including silicon wafers, photoresists, and wafer-processing equipment.

And the country is already a major force in robotics and factory automation. Japan remained the world’s second largest market for industrial robots in 2024, with an operational stock of around 450,500 units. Japanese companies are also among the world’s leading robot manufacturers.

Japan has already committed heavily to rebuilding semiconductor manufacturing. Between 2020 and 2024, semiconductor investment in Japan reached $27 billion, a larger commitment relative to the size of the economy than the US made under Joe Biden’s CHIPS Act.

Sushi-rolling its way back to the top

Boosting Japan’s cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing industry is also a key plank in the ambitious industrial plan unveiled in June 2026 by Japan’s recently elected Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi.

Takaichi’s plan calls for investing more than ¥370 trillion ($2.3 trillion) in the 14-year period ending in March 2041, with ¥101.6 trillion earmarked for artificial intelligence and chips spending alone.

The objective, she argues, is not simply to make more chips. It is to secure the technologies, materials, equipment, and manufacturing expertise that Japan believes will underpin the AI economy.

“Japan’s potential growth rate has been sluggish in comparison to other major advanced nations, but it is not the case that Japan’s strengths have eroded,” Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi told a press conference in July 2026. “Instead, what we lacked was sufficient investment and the national resolve to believe in the latent power of the Japanese people, cultivate that potential extensively, and link it to Japan’s economic growth.”

Yet international investors remain concerned that Takaichi’s plans for a huge expansion of public and private investment could trigger a Liz Trussstyle economic shock, with worries about Japan’s already high public debt pushing long-term government bond yields higher.

Oxford Economics warned in July that the government’s investment guidelines “heighten the risk of serious fiscal slippage” in the coming years, with the strategy relying on bridge bonds and optimistic assumptions about productivity growth. Those concerns have since intensified. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield has approached 3%, as investors question whether the country’s economic growth can outpace the rising cost of servicing its enormous debt.

The semiconductor investment carries technological and commercial risks too. Advanced fabs cost tens of billions of dollars to build. Competition from Taiwan, South Korea, the US, and China remains intense. And semiconductor technology evolves so quickly that today’s leading edge can become tomorrow’s mature node.

Japan’s industrial revival faces a more fundamental constraint: people. The IMF’s Japan Chief Rahul Anand said the country would need a “multi-pronged approach” to address its “demographic driven labour shortages”, including greater labour mobility, investment in human capital, and targeted increases in foreign-worker inflows. He also pointed to investment in labour-saving technologies such as AI as part of the solution – potentially turning one of Japan’s biggest economic weaknesses into a reason to accelerate automation.

For Japan, rebuilding semiconductors therefore means rebuilding skills, suppliers, and ecosystems – not simply constructing fabs.

This article originally appeared in the Sept/Oct issue of Procurement Pro